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constitutional interpretation and the
american tradition of individual rights
thomas

B

mcaffee

one of the most distinctive features of american constitutionalism
is the idea that the constitution is law it is fairly clear that the founders
viewed the constitution as a rather ordinary species of written law albeit
the supreme law of the land 2 in fact when the supreme court set forth
its claim to arbitrate the meaning of the constitution in the famous case
of marbury vs madison the courts central premises were that the
constitution is the law and that the courts are competent to interpret the
constitution in a case presenting a constitutional issue 3 while the great
chief justice john marshall relied on some specific texts to support the
jurisdiction of the court the heart of the matter was that the point of a
written constitution was to bind the government and judges were
therefore bound to give effect to the constitution over conflicting
legislative or executive acts
early proponents of the supreme courts interpretive role believed
that rules of legal construction and the doctrine of precedent defined and
limited the courts power alexander hamilton wrote to avoid an
arbitrary discretion in the courts it is indispensable that they should be
bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and
point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them 4
hamiltons reference to the rules or canons of construction used as
guides in the interpretation of written law reflected a widely held faith in
a sharp distinction between the lawmaking performed by legislators
and the judicial role of interpretation 5 hamilton thus expressed
confidence that in fulfilling their duty to declare the sense of the law
courts must always exercise judgment and never will lest they
substitute their pleasure to that of the legislative body 6 As long as
judges stayed within their prescribed role of exercising judgment rather
than mere will their role would be justified because they were following
the superior will of the sovereign people to the inferior will of their
governmental agents 7 one of the central issues in modem constitutional
1
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thought concerns whether and if so to what extent hamiltons interpretive model can aid us in defining and justifying the courts role today
stated most generally the question has come down to whether there is
any set of objective principles of interpretation that is capable of limiting
the role of courts in our constitutional scheme to any significant extent
modern theorists agree that hamiltons
the greatest number of modem
the judicial role to interpretation as sharply distinguished
model limiting thejudicial
from lawmaking does not accurately reflect the realities of making and
interpreting law lawmakers not only state and define rules for courts to
apply they also by design as well as by inadvertence provide courts
with the task of filling out the implications of a general design or of
confronting questions that the lawmaker did not address or did not
address clearly for some theorists however the skepticism runs deeper
yet they view the distinction between lawmaking and interpretation as
completely illusory and see judges as political actors who are virtually
always imposing their will 8
even among those who find neither extreme view acceptable there
is considerable debate on the one hand are those who contend for a
significant role for evidence of original intent
or perhaps more
broadly original context in any proper approach to the interpretive
process 9 this call for a return to a jurisprudence of original intent has
in turn been met with a chorus of criticism from those who see it as a
threat to the progress of the living constitution 10 unfortunately the
debate has frequently been approached from an ei theror perspective as
trainers must either control all constitutional
though the intent of the framers
questions or be used as mere window dressing while some advocates
of original intent may overstate the extent to which historical evidence
can aid constitutional construction a commitment to the principle that
evidence extrinsic to the text can clarify meaning in ways that bind
decision makers does not entail seeing historical evidence as a grand
key that will remove all difficulties in constitutional interpretation or
entirely resolve the riddle of detennining
determining the proper role for courts in a
democratic society it will hardly do to launch a broad scale attack on the
use of original context on the grounds that claims as to its potential have
been inflated
some seeming opponents of original intent have been somewhat
obscure as to whether they are opposed to seeing original intent as a
panacea or are staking out the much stronger claim that based on
theoretical or practical objections original intent can never raise binding
obligations 12 some have argued that the search for original intent will not
provide answers to the difficult issues of contemporary application of
constitutional provisions but have not clarified whether text read in
context might resolve ambiguities or establish outside boundaries or at
least some core applications of a particular provision 13 those most
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emphatic about the total poverty of original context seem in general to be
committed either to the view that the search for binding intent is
practically impossible or even theoretically incoherent so that only the
practicallyimpossible
text if anything binds us or to the view that the framers lacked authority
to bind us
in this essay 1I will offer grounds for doubting the correctness of the
first of these views As to the second it would require a separate article
to fully defend the traditional assumptions that the constitution binds us
until it is amended and that we are bound by the ascertainable meaning
of the document where it is clear from text and context 14 these were the
vs madison and I1 consider them to be woven into
premises oi
of
oimarbury
marbury
the fabric of our law at a more practical level the view that we are not
bound by the clear meaning of the text would not be sustained by the
american public for a month if the supreme court were to announce it
as the basis for a constitutional judgment and advocates of such
positions would have a difficult time persuading presidents and
legislators that they should consider themselves bound by supreme
court decisions if the court viewed itself as empowered to amend clear
text by ascribing a meaning of its own if courts are bound by clear text
as most have supposed it is difficult to see why they should not be
equally bound by context fully capable of clarifying the meaning of text
in the second part of the essay I1 will suggest some of the limits of
original context in determining the meaning of constitutional language
and try to identify the senses in which the metaphor of a living constitution accurately describes our constitutional order as well as the ways
in which it might be misleading or unhelpful the key to the analysis as
we shall see is the distinction between the search for meaning and the
role courts inevitably play in applying constitutional language when the
search for meaning has ended when the courts role shifts from
discovering meaning to effectuating generally worded norms the debate
over the role of context becomes in important ways a discussion of
institutional and constitutional philosophy
finally 1I will take up a central debate in modem constitutional
theory the debate over whether or to what extent the protection of
individual rights is properly limited to some number of rights
enumerated in the text of the constitution applying insights developed
in earlier parts of the essay 1I will examine the questions raised by the
american tradition of discovering some rights as implicit in the concept
of limited government embodied in the social contract we call the
constitution and will explore the possibilities and problems for both
sides of the debate over the judicial articulation of unenumerated
individual rights that debate however as we shall see need not
implicate the straightforward duty of courts to apply the constitution
when its meaning is ascertainable from text and context
15
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OF FINDING ORIGINAL INTENT

perhaps the most common argument against the use of original
intent is that it is simply impossible to find 16 opponents present a host
of theoretical difficulties including problems involved in deciding
whose intentions should count as well as in determining and counting the
intentions of relevant collective bodies congresses or state ratifying
bodies 17 the objections are formidable as well as complex and even
monaghan perhaps the most articulate proponent of original intent
has acknowledged that the possibility of a stable theory of constitutional interpretation may depend on the ability of scholars with like
views to confront the problems raised moreover some objections are
embraced not only by those opposed to the very notion that the meaning
of the constitution could or should ever be fixed but also by some who
defend the notion of a binding constitutional text 19
no detailed response to these various objections will be attempted
in this essay instead 1I will offer some general skepticism about the
more extreme forms of interpretive skepticism followed by two
illustrative examples designed to provide confirmation of these general
observations
it seems apparent that the most powerful and cogent objections to
discovering the original intent underlying constitutional provisions
apply equally well to the attempt to discover the ordinary legislative
intent underlying any statute the common problems include the
difficulty of ascribing intent to any individual complexities
associated with counting intentions and determining the intent of
large numbers of people and problems presented by the distorting
effects of group decision making the constitutional context does
present the unique problem of determining whose intentions count
whether ratifiers or framers and how the intentions of many
ratifiers
rati fiers could reliably be determined 20 virtually all of the skeptical
literature however treats the remaining problems associated with
determining intent as being sufficient to justify a skeptical position
while there exists a parallel controversy in the world of statutory
interpretation as to the role that extrinsic evidence of intent should
play 21 it is noteworthy that the trend among modem courts has been in
the direction of increased use of relevant context including
legislative history to shed light on the meaning of statutes 22
theoretical objections to our ability to discover the collective intent
of large groups of individuals have given way to the practical
experience of most judges that original context can shed light on
statutory meaning
some skeptics such as justice william J brennan are
ar e capable on
the one hand of debunking the notion of discovering original intent
8
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while on the other praising the vision of the individual embodied in the
constitution and the freedom the dignity and the rights of all persons
within our borders which it is the great design of the constitution to
23
perhaps this sort of appeal to a basic vision or design is
secure
simply a device for linking modem value choices to the most general
formulation of the weight of our political tradition 24 perhaps but it has
a peculiar ring to it suggesting that the speaker is claiming fidelity to
what is most basic about our constitutional system itself to the framers
own commitment to freedom and dignity
but why should we think we can discern what is central to the
constitutional design if we cannot possibly divine what was intended by
any particular provision the most thoughtful commentators on
statutory interpretation have observed that one of the ironies of the attack
on the concept of legislative intent is the frequent substitution of talk
policies and objectives without any
about legislative purposes
attempt to show that arguments leading to the rejection of talk about
legislative intent have no force against these new expressions 25 such
observations seem equally applicable to appeals to the purpose of the

constitution
As with many forms of skepticism when proponents of skeptical
m plete
complete
piete their arguments they frequently
views about original intent co
turn in other writings or sections to familiar discourse about the
purposes and intentions of those responsible for the constitution or one
of its important amendments as though it were possible to discover
them and to find them relevant at least in interpreting constitutional
provisions 26 this points up that no matter what real difficulties may be
presented by constitutional text and history for the discovery of a usable
original intent those difficulties frequently enough seem surmountable
with respect to at least some issues
now for the illustrations
slaughter house cases rl the supreme court adopted a
in the slaughterhouse
reading of the privileges or immunities clause of section 1I of the
post civil war fourteenth amendment that ran against the grain of the
purposes of the clause as revealed by the legislative history of congresss
deliberations there are overwhelming grounds for rejecting the reading
adopted by justice miller writing for the majority even though the
arguments for the opposing view are neither overwhelming nor even
conclusive on textual grounds alone
slaughter house cases new orleans butchers challenged
in the slaughterhouse
the constitutionality of a state legislative grant of a monopoly on
butchering they contended that the granting of a monopoly constituted
an abridgment of their right to pursue a professional calling which fell
within the scope of the privileges or immunities protected by the
clause the butchers argued that the fourteenth amendment privileges
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or immunities clause was essentially derived from the privileges and
immunities clause of article 4 section 2 and was designed to give
federal protection to the basic civil rights protected in the earlier
provision
justice miller however found that the article 4 clause was an
anti
antidiscrimination
nonresidents
discrimination provision to protect non
residents in the exercise of2821
rights otherwise within the exclusive regulatory domain of the states
he concluded that an article 4 reading of the fourteenth amendment
clause would entail a revolutionary enlargement of the powers of
congress and the federal courts over state law rights that were
traditionally within the exclusive domain of the states enlargement
beyond what he was willing to acknowledge animated the framers of the
amendment 229 As an alternative justice miller relied on the explicit
distinction in section I1 between state and national citizenship to buttress
his conclusion that the privileges or immunities of citizens ofthe
odthe
of the united
states more fully secured rights already protected by the constitution
explicitly or implicitly which were bestowed upon individuals by virtue
of their national citizenship 30 he listed as rights dependent on national
citizenship the right to travel to the seat of government to assemble and
petition the writ of habeas corpus and rights guaranteed by virtue of
treaties and other national enactments 31
there is only one significant problem with justice millers reading
of the privileges or immunities clause it is clearly wrong there is no
question that article 4 was the antecedent provision that inspired the
privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment congress
enacted the civil rights act of 1866 and sent forth the fourteenth
amendment in response to the enactment of the so called black codes
12
by the slave states of the south 32
the black codes were designed to
effectively undercut the thirteenth amendment prohibition on slavery
by denying basic civil rights to the former slaves rights such as the right
to contract to own property to testify in court and to sue and be sued 33
in justifying the view that congress should act to enforce these civil
rights belonging to individuals because of their united states citizenship
congressional leaders invoked the privileges and immunities clause of
14
article 4 34
in defense of both the civil rights act and the proposed amendment
proponents relied on the case of corfield vs coryell 35 in that early
decision construing the scope of the article 4 privileges and immunities
clause justice washington found that the rights protected by that
provision included all the basic civil rights that individuals enjoy in true
republics 36 these rights included the same rights enumerated in the civil
rights act as was observed by its house and senate sponsors 37 while the
corfield case itself concerned the limits of state power to discriminate
against non
nonresidents
residents as to the relevant privileges and immunities
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proponents of post civil war provisions for civil rights used the broad
language in corfieldto
to support the argument that all american citizens
corfield
held such federally protected civil rights even against their own state
governments
there is room for significant doubt as to whether congressional
38
4
and
correctly
article
interpreted
leaders
there is no doubt
corfield
however that congressman john bingham the principal draftsman of
section 1I of the fourteenth amendment interpreted article 4 broadly and
drafted the fourteenth amendment clause to ensure the rights listed in
9
corfield9 by contrast justice millers interpretation of the provision
corfield
not only finds no support in the legislative history of section 1 but is
actually undercut by that history
it is tempting to believe that the text alone is sufficient to prove that
slaughter house misconstrued the provision the phrase privileges or
slaughterhouse
immunities in section 1 certainly suggests a possible connection to the
antecedent article 4 provision but the language as easily points in
justice millers direction the language in section 1I refers to the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the united states as opposed to
as
article 4sprivileges
4s privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states
considering that the first sentence of section 1 specifically distinguishes
state and national citizenship it is quite plausible to construe the clause
as recognizing a second distinguishable set of rights
it has been further argued that justice millers construction
renders the clause superfluous or trivial 40 it is thought to be superfluous
because by millers own formulation it is referring to rights that
already receive protection under the constitution either implicitly or
explicitly but there are other constitutional provisions that are merely
declaratory of what many thought was already understood for
example the tenth amendment states the principle already implicit in
the constitution that powers not delegated to the national government
are reserved to the states or to the people moreover providing greater
security for several of the rights listed by justice miller by giving them
textual recognition and empowering congress to enforce them looks
trivial to us only because we know from extrinsic evidence that the
fourteenth amendment was really enacted to protect the freeman against
hostile state action 41
one might question how significant these conclusions are particularly since there remains controversy over the intended breadth of the
privileges or immunities clause 42 the practical implication of modem
skepticism about the search for intended meaning is that many provisions
in the constitution will be reduced to a debate about constitutional
policy should we construe the clause broadly so as to maximize the
protection given to individuals against the state or are we more properly
concerned about the potential impact on our federal system or on the
16
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judicial power of the broader reading of the clause the most
exercise of ofjudicial
absolute skeptics about intent frequently seem to believe that they have
the best answers to these sorts of questions better than any the framers
intended to embody in the text 43
As for myself I1 am much more certain that justice miller
acted illegitimately in construing the clause contrary to the overwhelming
wh elming evidence of its intended meaning than I1 ever could be that
his concerns about the erosion of state power and the enlargement of
judicial power were illegitimate or lacking in judicial statesmanship however for those interested in preserving individual rights
the battle against original understanding could in the long run work to
undercut our commitment to abiding by the rights recognized in the
text properly read the privileges or immunities example points up that
such questions are not all of the same order of magnitude particularly
where basic questions as to the essential thrust of a provision are
presented by an ambiguous text the possibilities for discovering a
determinative intent are quite genuine one additional example must
suffice
the historical evidence is overwhelming that article Is grant
to congress of the power to declare war means when read in context
that congress holds the exclusive power to change the status of the
nation from peace to war to advance foreign policy objectives as
opposed to defending against sudden attack 44 when contemporaneous evidence extrinsic to the text is combined with the under
standing reflected in the nations experiences it is clear that the
president may wage war only when it is thrust upon the nation by an
enemy 45 some commentators have raised legitimate issues as to the
modem reach of the presidents emergency power in a world in which
we are committed as a nation to the idea that an attack on western
europe for example is an attack on the united states 46 but such
questions reflecting the vagueness of the framers concept of a
sudden attack that warrants executive dispatch cannot obscure
completely the distinction between a policy decision to wage war and
war that is thrust upon us As wormuth and firmage point out the
framers did not give the president the right to choose between war
and peace or the right to make a judgment concerning the security of
they provided for the president to act in the
the united states instead theyprovided
defense of the country 47 the commitment of half a million troops to
vietnam or the mining of harbors in nicaragua can hardly be justified
by any notion of emergency power unless we simply ignore the mandate
of the constitution itself once again however it is much easier to say
what the text requires in the light of original context and confirming
history than what modem conditions require of constitutional
statesmen 48
11
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ON THE IDEA OF A LIVING

constitution

there is a conventional wisdom that the constitution

is sui generis
and requires an entirely different interpretive method than a statute this
view is frequently expressed with the metaphor of a living constitution
or by reference to justice marchalls
Mar
marshalls
shalls famous reminder that it is a
constitution we are expounding 49 it is not easy to separate the senses
in which these ways of speaking tell us something accurate and important
from the ways in which they can become dangerously misleading for
one thing while the constitution is obviously not a code it unquestionably contains provisions that are as specific and unambiguous as those
found in any statute 50 if the notion of a living constitution is to be
applied to these provisions then we truly have no written constitution
for we have turned it into a blank check moreover as we have seen some
questions presented by ambiguous or vague texts can also be resolved
with the aid of original context to ignore what that context tells us is
quite simply to amend the constitution by construction something that

justice marshall would not have countenancer
countenanced
occasionally even thoughtful scholars have suggested that
the constitution must change in meaning to confront technological
changes that the framers could not foresee such as home invasions
through electronic eavesdropping 51 while our changing world can
create difficult choices for constitutional interpreters many such
examples including new methods of invading privacy can readily be
seen as falling within the original meaning and intent of relevant
provisions 52 no one has doubted that congresss power to regulate
commerce includes and was intended to include not only
commercial shipping but railroads and air transportation as well though
neither existed in 1787 lon fuller long ago pointed out the conceptual
confusion involved in the assumption that we think in particulars rather
than in general concepts a view that he called the pointer theory
of meaning 53 to insist that electronically stored data receives no
protection under the fourth amendment because the framers did not
know of it would make as little sense as contending that a 1920 statute
dealing with motor cars could not be read as covering volkswagens 54
it does not require a special theory of constitutional interpretation
to acknowledge that the meaning of constitutional provisions is not
necessarily circumscribed by the immediate purposes of the framers
experts on language and statutory interpretation have long recognized
that meaning can outstrip intent for an author inevitably encompasses
in what he says more than he has specifically in mind and often
encompasses even more than he has generally in mind 55 furthermore
there may be constitutional provisions that are sufficiently vague and
general as to require supplementation and whose meanings can hardly be
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equated with the expectations held for them 56 this problem too is not
unique to constitutional construction as modem antitrust legislation
provides a classic example 57 these clauses will require constitutional
decision makers and in particular courts to develop the provisions
contours this is not to say that such provisions are meaningless but only
that the language alone even when read in relevant context will not
resolve a large number of contemporary issues 58 the result is that we
inevitably will have a living constitution to some extent yet even with
vague open textured provisions there remains the issue of the meaning
to be ascribed to them simply because the constitutional language read
in context is not dispositive it does not follow that the supreme court is
free to go directly to moral theory or societal consensus to supplement the
provisions meaning 59
in the analogous field of statutory interpretation it is usually
thought that the court should create a rule that is at least not inconsistent
with what extrinsic evidence shows were the purposes and intentions of
the legislature lacking any such clear evidence courts are expected to
make their decisions cohere with what is already settled by the legal
order 60 even if these basic assumptions were transferred to the constitutional arena courts would be required to make some basic value choices
because the history is frequently quite unclear and the vague text invites
consideration of whether contemporary problems are sufficiently like
those confronting the framers to warrant inclusion within the scope of the
provision
the larger issue is whether courts ought to seek authoritative
guidance from the reasonably knowable intentions and purposes of the
framers in these circumstances many contend that changing conditions
and moral conceptions make it inevitable that modem courts will
basically go it alone in filling out the meaning of the constitutions open
textured provisions with due regard for the outside limits suggested by
a text continuity and the lessons of history 61 there is certainly reason
to doubt whether modem decision makers ought to feel compelled by the
original understanding of broadly worded provisions where it appears
that the framers themselves were essentially involved in the same
process we are engaging in a contest of opinion over the appropriate
implications of the principle being invoked 62
finally even if we agree that many constitutional issues are
left unresolved by text and history it does not necessarily follow that
this indeterminacy should lead to a continually expanding judicial
role 63 As neil komesar has recently observed these coexist with a
constitutional system that assumes on almost any current reading that
the lions share of societys
socie tys decision making load will be carried by the
political branches no matter how vague and general the text advocates
of an activist judicial role must explain why in a world of imperfect
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decision makers a given set of questions are best resolved by the
institution we know as courts 64 one prominent commentator terence
sandalow has observed that although an independent judiciary may be
better suited than other government actors to dispassionately apply
governing principles despite competing pressures it is more debatable
socie tys
whether the judiciary is especially suited to discern or generate societys
fundamental values 65
the most important contemporary challenge to this traditional
caution about the role of courts comes from individual rights theorists
who contend that the supreme court needs a broader rather than a
narrower vision of its role for them the key to the open textured
provisions of the constitution is to be sought in the natural rights heritage
that served as a backdrop to the constitutions recognition of individual
rights it is to the question of the relevance of our natural rights heritage
to the contemporary debate over individual rights that we now turn
THE UNWRITTEN

constitution

the

debate over the interpretation of the written constitution is
complicated in the area of individual rights by the existence of a tradition
that sees the text as suggestive rather than exhaustive of the rights
protected by the constitution the idea of an unwritten constitution has
its roots in the natural law tradition that influenced the founding period
through the writings of john locke and others 66 resting on the social
contract political theory the premise was that men bring rights with them
to civil society and that governments role and justification is to protect
those natural rights from the viewpoint of this tradition the written
constitution embodies this underlying moral and political model but is
not a substitute for it
early in the nations history justice chase reached beyond the
specific textual issues presented in cedar vs bull to clarify his view that
state power is not without controul even though its authority should
not be expressly restrained by the constitution or fundamental law of
pot
bot
the state 67 according to chase the purposes for which men enter
into society will determine the nature and terms of the social compact
and as they are the foundation of the legislative power they will decide
what are the proper objects of it chase was not alone in this view the
leading judges of the nation prior to 1830 including justices marshall
and story rested decisions in whole or in part on a natural law ground in
protecting contract and property rights against retroactive or otherwise
arbitrary legislative acts 68
even so the tension between this strain of thought and the justi69
is
fi
vs
in
review
marbury
of
madison
apparent
judicial
fication
Mar burys rationale is that there is a judicial duty to fulfill the purpose
marburys
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of a written constitution by giving effect to the supreme law of the
land 70 justice marshall relied on the constitutions explicit grant to the
supreme court of jurisdiction over cases arising under this constitution 71 it is not obvious how the constitution empowers the court to
strike down laws because they run afoul of proscriptions
proscript ions of natural law
prescriptions
that are not expressed in the constitutional text it is not surprising then
that justice chases natural rights theory in calder
colder
caider was strenuously
opposed in a separate opinion by justice iredell
A constitutional founder iredell contended that the purpose of the
written constitution was to define with precision the objects of the
legislative power and to restrain its exercise within marked and settled
boundaries while any legislative act that violates those constitutional
prohibitions would thus be void courts may not pronounce as void
legislation within the general scope of the legislatures constitutional
power merely because it is deemed contrary to the principles of natural
justice iredell saw not only a conflict with the concept of a written
constitution but also a danger to republican government since ideas of
natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard and are the subject of
disagreement by reasonable men iredell could see no basis for courts to
use their own views of the proper application of abstract principles of
natural justice to nullify the acts of the people speaking through their
12
elected representatives 72
in the long run the perceived tension between the natural rights
tradition and the written constitution drove the natural rights doctrine
underground where it found a home in the due process clauses of state
constitutions and in the federal bill of rights and the fourteenth amendment 73 such provisions generally provided that no person could be
deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law 74 the
agreed upon core meaning of these clauses was that individuals must
have notice and an opportunity for a hearing to contest the legal
justification of the state for any of the enumerated deprivations 75 courts
reasoned further that this right to adjudication belonged in the courts and
that laws that applied new standards retroactively or that effectively
adjudicated particular cases rather than establishing general rules to
govern future conduct equally denied individuals the opportunity to
show that the deprivation of their interests was not justified by
16
preexisting legal standards 76
the doctrine that legislatures must proceed by general rules
became the wedge that opened the door to broader arguments that validly
enacted laws might partake of the form of law only without being
substantially valid law sufficient to justify a deprivation of liberty and
property 77 courts thus saw themselves as empowered to determine that
legislatures had acted arbitrarily and had therefore denied due process of
law the transplanted natural rights tradition thrived and due process
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became the container into which the supreme court poured its own
vision of implied limits on government during the first third of this
century the court poured into that container a laissez faire vision rooted
in nineteenth century liberal political theory as it struck down social
reform legislation that it perceived as being in conflict with the nations
78
of
heritage private rights
with the paradigm shift that was called the new deal the supreme
court repudiated a good deal of its interventionist laissez faire case
law 79 but the concept of implied rights was never entirely rejected and
more recently the court has harked back to the laissez faire era in
protecting rights of access to contraception and abortion while
elaborating the newly fashioned right of privacy a fundamental right
of gradually unfolding but still largely uncertain dimension 80
As with justice chases pure natural law theory of course the due
process natural rights tradition has always had its critics scholars have
contended that the implied rights reading of the due process clause is an
unwarranted gloss that lacks adequate textual and historical roots 81 the
research to date seems at least to bear out Cor
corwins
wins historical thesis that
carwins
the doctrine owes more to the natural rights premise that there are implicit
limits on government power than to any attempt to explicate the
historical meaning of due process of law 82 while some judges and
scholars would thus reject the doctrine entirely others have been
satisfied to caution judges to exercise restraint as they consider the
a
institution imposing a natural
ofanonmajoritarian
practical implications of
nonmajoritarian
rights agenda on a pluralistic society 83
since the 1950s the natural rights debate has been rekindled by the
rediscovery of a text that seems more naturally suited to accommodate
such a reading of our constitutional system the ninth amendment
which reads the enumeration in the constitution of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people A number of scholars have found in this textual reference to
unenumerated rights a reflection of the social contract and natural rights
framework out of which our constitutional system developed 84 it is
under girds justice chases thesis that
possible that this is the text that undergirds
some enforceable constitutional rights are implicit in the nature and
purpose of government whether or not they are spelled out in any text 85
this ninth amendment argument found its way to the supreme
court for the first time in 1965 when the court decided griswold vs
connecticut in a concurring opinion justice goldberg relied on the
ninth amendment to undergird the courts decision establishing a
constitutional right to privacy and striking down a connecticut statute
16
that prohibited the use of artificial birth control by married couples 86
since the griswold decision the supreme court has relied on the ninth
amendment only sparingly but an increasing number of lower federal
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court decisions have cited the ninth amendment in support of broad
holdings in favor of individual rights 87
As one might expect however there is no consensus that the
ninth amendment is properly read as empowering courts to enforce
unenumerated rights the ninth amendment emerged from the debate
at the state ratifying conventions as to the necessity and risks of including
a bill of rights in the constitution 88 while many ratifiers
rati fiers objected to the
framers failure to include a bill of rights in the constitution fearing that
a powerful central government would pose a threat to liberty opponents
of a bill of rights contended that the rights of the people were not at risk
because the national government had been granted only limited and
enumerated powers 89 the underlying premise of this argument was that
under the constitutions scheme of limited government the sovereign
people retained as rights all the powers not specifically delegated to the
national government 90
even while constructing the case for the necessity of a bill of rights
james madison acknowledged the force of the argument that the
constitution is a bill of powers the great residuum being the rights of
the people madison went on however to observe that the national
government has certain discretionary powers with respect to the means
which may admit of abuse to a certain extent in the same manner as the
powers of the state governments under their constitutions may to an
indefinite extent 91 A bill of rights was therefore needed
more fundamentally opponents of a bill of rights objected that the
listing of specific rights might actually undercut the original design for
protecting rights by raising the inference that the national government
was empowered to invade those spheres of private rights not included
james wilson set forth this argument in its plainest terms before the
pennsylvania ratifying convention
A bill of rights annexed to a constitution is an enumeration of the powers
reserved if we attempt an enumeration every thing that is not enumerated
is presumed to be given the consequence is that an imperfect enumeration
would throw all implied power into the scale of the government and the
92
rights of the people would be rendered incomplete 22

madison who had once opposed inclusion of a bill of rights wrote to
jefferson in 1788 that he would support a bill of rights provided it be so
formed as not to imply powers not to be included in the enumeration 93
the ninth amendments rights retained by the people then might be
simply the great residuum of rights and powers that madison alluded
to even while defending the necessity of a bill of rights on this reading
the ninth amendment is a rule of construction that prohibits the
inference of new or enlarged governmental power from the enumeration
of specific rights this residual rights reading is the one adopted by the
two dissenting opinions in griswold vs connecticut4
connecticut4
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the legislative history of the ninth amendment lends support

to

this residual rights reading prior to the work of the first congress
new york and virginia addressed the implied powers concern in their
proposed amendments to the new constitution both of which stated that
the clauses which limited congresss powers should not be construed to
imply that congress may exercise any powers not given in the consti
conati
aution indeed both also provided that the rights provisions should be
tution
construed either as exceptions to the specified powers or as inserted
merely for greater caution thereby acknowledging the continuing
significance of the framers structural protection of the residuum of
rights 95
it is obvious that madison drafted the resolution that became the
ninth amendment from these state proposals he included additional
language however as shown by the italics in the text of his resolution
reprinted below

the exceptions

here or elsewhere in the constitution made in favor of
thejust
just importance
particular rights shall not be so construed as to diminish the
of other rights retained by the people or as to enlarge the powers delegated
by the constitution but either as actual limitations of such powers or as
91
inserted merely for greater caution 96

the basic question is whether the italicized language was intended only
to emphasize the protection of residual or retained rights of the
people or whether it was intended instead or also to refer decision
makers to legally enforceable unenumerated rights that might limit the
power of congress acting generally within its enumerated powers
madison explained the resolution in these terms
it has been objected also against the bill of rights that by enumerating
particular exceptions to the grant of power it would disparage those rights
which were not placed in that enumeration and it might follow by implication that those rights which were not singled out were intended to be
assigned into the hands of the general government and were consequently
insecure 9791

given the entire context a surprising number of commentators have
taken this statement as a straightforward articulation of the enforceable
98
rights construction of Madi
resolution
but the enforceable
madisons
sons
matisons
rights construction is anything but straightforward
for one thing the language of the statement easily lends itself to the
more restrictive residual rights reading madison says that the
disparagement of retained rights that stems from enumerating particular
exceptions to the grant of power occurs when it is inferred that the rights
are assigned into the hands of the general government Madi
sons fear
madisons
matisons
seems to be that particular exceptions to power will be read to infer
enlarged powers that disparage the rights that otherwise would have been
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retained by the device of enumerated governmental powers rather
than being retained by the people they will be assigned into the hands
of the general government additional considerations lend plausibility
to this equally straightforward reading since Madi
madisons
sons resolution
matisons
clearly speaks to the feared enlargement of powers construction that had
prompted the new york and virginia proposals he drew upon it would
have been odd for him to introduce so casually a quite separate approach
to providing greater security to the peoples rights
it is true that the final text of the ninth amendment omits the
language referring to a feared enlargement of powers construction and
refers only to the concern that retained rights not be denied or disparaged
while the drafting history is unavailable it seems plausible to think that
language forbidding a construction that disparaged rights and implied
enlarged powers was considered redundant and that the language of the
amendment was therefore purified toward an emphasis on the goal of
preserving residual rights the alternative is that the drafters at some
point decided to pursue exclusively the separate strategy of referring to
unenumerated enforceable rights as the most effective means of
maximizing the protection of rights in the place of seeking to avoid the
inference of expanded governmental powers
the historical evidence suggests that madison did not see the
refined version as operationally different from his original proposal
during the ratification debate in virginia edmund randolph objected to
the language employed contending that the provision should operate
rather as a provision against extending the powers of congress by their
own authority than as a protection to rights reducible to no definitive
certainty 100 but madison in a letter to president washington called
randolphe
randolphs
Randolp
hs argument fanciful contending if a line can be drawn
between the powers granted and the rights retained it would seem to be
the same thing whether the latter be secured by declaring that they shall
101
0
l
oi
be
that
the
shall
be
or
former
extended
madison
abridged
not
not
appears to have expressly adopted the residual rights construction of
the amendment and to have rejected randolphe
that the
randolphs
Randolp
hs suggestion
proposed language declared an alternative strategy 102
foreclosed
it may be another matter of course to say that the history forecloses
reliance on the ninth amendment in support of an implied rights
approach to the constitution 103 considering that madison accepted the
need for a bill of rights despite the constitutions implicit recognition of
residual rights it is conceivable that he or others came to prefer the
strategy of referring to additional unenumerated limitations to one of
merely avoiding a construction of enlarged powers moreover there is
no conclusive evidence that members of congress or the legislatures
that ratified the bill of rights understood this language as in effect
precluding only implied grants of power to congress 104 whether its
11

O

0
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adopters intended it or not early in the nineteenth century state constitutions adopted essentially identical language even though given the
absence of the device of enumerated powers the only purpose of such
115
language would be to refer to additional limitations 105
at the least however the historical evidence belies the modem
assertion that the ninth amendment is the key to construing the
log
individual rights provisions of the constitution 106 rather it is a symbol
of the debate over the search for rights going beyond the text most
constitutional law scholars agree for example that the ninth amendment like the bill of rights generally initially served only to limit the
national gov
emment 107
government
the fourteenth amendment enacted after the civil war is the
constitutions primary source of limitation on state power but our most
pressing individual rights controversies arise most frequently in
challenges to state law while one historical claim is that the fourteenth
amendment was intended to incorporate all of the bill of rights which
would presumably include the ninth amendment that claim remains
controversial and has never been embraced by a majority of the supreme
court 108 modem invocation of the ninth amendment is best seen as a
way of appealing to the natural rights tradition as a source for informing
our judgment in giving effect to the generally worded provisions of the
0

O

fourteenth amendment
A growing number of contemporary theorists see the task of
constitutional decision makers as that of drawing out the modem
implications of the social contract and natural rights tradition that
characterizes our constitutional origins and development at least one set
of such commentators perceive in these traditions a commitment to
human rights and individual dignity the key to giving effect to the
constitutions generally worded provisions in their view is the
explication of our moral commitment to the dignity and autonomy
of individuals and the interpretation of individual rights becomes
essentially an attempt to explicate the principles of liberal moral and
log
indeed in one prominent formulation the
political philosophy 109
supreme court is seen as a kind of moral prophet that speaks on behalf
of the essentially religious commitment of americans to the possibility
of moral decision making and moral progress 100 whatever the formulation the role of courts in human rights cases is conceived as discerning
moral truths rather than pursuing some legal norm rooted in text history
tradition or consensus
many would agree that the existence of the implied rights tradition
the interpretive freedom provided by the generality and vagueness of
long standing nature of some governing
central texts or simply the longstanding
precedent make it unthinkable that we will cease to find some individual
rights to be implicit in the text or design of the constitution many
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however question whether this leads to the ideal of the courts as ultimate
arbiters of human rights in general it is important to realize that there are
other ways of understanding our origins and traditions other voices to be
heard beyond the modem theorists who think they have discovered the
originss of liberal theory and the tradition of natural rights
origin
in the first place even though the natural rights tradition has roots
in currents of thought during the founding period it is by no means clear
that the founding generation as a whole equated natural and
constitutional rights nl if social contract thinking leads naturally to a
written constitution it does not follow that the founding generation
lockbean
embraced the political philosophy of john locke let alone that lockean
political philosophy is especially congenial with modem versions of
Contractarian moral and political theory 112 indeed a leading scholar on
contractarian
the unwritten constitution acknowledges that the notion of an enforceable fundamental law underlying the written norms
norins was identified during
the founding period with conservative political forces that were
concerned with ensuring common law rights that they identified with
british traditions and the art of legal reasoning 3 modem moral theories
of human rights have come a long distance from the thinking of the
founding generation
moreover the founding period was characterized by a preoccupation with public virtue as a prerequisite to republican forms of
government 114 while these republican thinkers did not necessarily
conceive of government as charged with inculcating the qualities of
virtue their political thought presumed the existence of public values
a civil religion embodying the basic principles of the christian
life 5 modem commentators have observed that the republican political
theory of the founding period did not rest on liberal foundations and
legal historians increasingly see liberalism as rising to dominance in
ilg
american thought only at a later period 116
while the constitution has
been seen as embodying more skeptical attitudes about human nature
than the more optimistic versions of republicanism the founding generation was in general more republican than liberal if the republican ideal
of community and its commitment to the search for the common good
provide a historical link to the modem positive states rejection of some
of the individualistic postulates of nineteenth century liberal theory it is
liberali sms preoccupation with
equally in tension with modem liberalisms
individual autonomy 17
judged by their characteristic thinking the delegates to the great
convention seem an unlikely group to have founded a government based
on overarching liberal principle with the supreme court as moral
prophet for one thing despite the support for judicial power to interpret
the constitution there was a good deal of skepticism about judicial
power generally during the founding period 8 more broadly the most
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important roles at the convention as well as in the new government were
played by men of affairs who relied upon experience and history and
ilg
As M E bradford
were skeptical of high theory in political matters 119
points out elsewhere in this issue ofbyu
of BYU studies the framers as a group
were more impressed with the traditions embodied in the british
constitution than with any abstract political theory
modem theorists have contended that liberal political theory
nevertheless does the best service to the framers general intentions
because it most adequately explicates the rights they recognized in the
light of the background principles they relied upon 120 to the extent that
these contentions involve any sort of historical claim terrance
sandalow has provided an effective critique
particular judgments
by wrenching the framers larger purposes from the particularjudgments
that revealed them we incur a loss of perspective a perspective that might
better enable us to see that the particular judgments they made were not
imperfect expressions of a larger purpose but a particular accommodation
of competing purposes in freeing ourselves from those judgments we are
not serving larger ends determined by the framers but making room for the
introduction of contemporary values 12

the argument from the framers

general intentions is probably
more accurately viewed as a normative theory aimed at making sense of
the framers choices as we attempt to build a just and coherent body of
constitutional law but even when viewed in this light it remains passing
strange that the best interpretation of the framers choices and of our
individual rights tradition would call on courts to engage in a systematic
explication of a complete moral theory of rights contrary to the role
courts have played in our constitutional system from the earliest days of
the republic even with the implied rights theory taken into account
american courts have never seen themselves as charged with the duty of
explicating and enforcing a general theory of human dignity and
autonomy 122
As for our constitutional development the judicial recognition of
implied limitations on government grew up in tension with a growing
judicial recognition of the power of the state to regulate what courts
123
power
police
the
in traditional formulations the police
called
power enabled the state to legislate to promote the public health safety
welfare and morals 124 in general courts historically presumed that
except for the violation of specific constitutional prohibitions states
were limited only by the duty to legislate in the public interest a
standard that of itself suggests rather limited constraints on government
power precluding only legislation that irrationally confers benefits or
imposes costs on a group or groups of citizens while various liberal
premises can be and on occasion have been worked into the require
ment of pursuing the general or public interest 25 there is little question
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that the traditional understanding of the nature and scope of the police
power cuts against the imposition of a general liberal theory 126 to use a
single example the modem liberal critique of morals legislation
involving so called victimless crimes conflicts with the competing
police power tradition
at a somewhat more philosophical level an important strand of
the american judicial tradition embodied by justices holmes
frankfurter harlan and others has given voice to the concerns about
the prospects for objectivity in moral and judicial decision making first
expressed by justice iredell in calder
colder
caider vs bull this tradition sees the
constitution including its potentially open ended provisions as
providing room for a wide variety of views about the proper ends of
government to the extent that constitutional text and context provide no
clear answers these judges have sought fundamental rights only as
long standing traditions and have advocated judicial self
revealed in longstanding
restraint as the guiding virtue for judges 127
perhaps not surprisingly in light of these competing elements of
our heritage although the modem supreme court has resurrected the
implied rights tradition its decisions appear based more nearly on its
own perception of tradition consensus and policy than on any over
121
28
arching moral theory of individual rights 128
while this may partially
reflect the difficulties of institutional decision making it also reflects a
basic dichotomy in thinking about individual rights that has its roots in
the founding period As described by the great legal theorist alexander
Con tractarian tradition sees individual rights as a set of
bickel the contractarian
preexisting moral standards by which political society is judged this is
the tradition of natural rights or god given rights rights that predate the
written constitution and are embodied in it the other tradition which
bickel calls the whig model sees rights as rooted in and limited by
an unfolding human culture and the values of a particular society As a
political or constitutional theory the whig view does not completely
eschew value choices in an evolving world but it is inclined to be
flexible pragmatic slow moving highly political as well as
12
relativistic 129 applied to judicial decision making the whig model
evokes the image of the traditional common law role of courts as the
di scemer of gradually evolving societal values rather than the image of
discerner
reformer or platonic guardian
the significance of these two models can of course be overdrawn
for we are dealing with a spectrum of views rather than a mere
dichotomy many modem thinkers for example embrace neither the
Con
nor the degree of mature
optimism of some modem contractarians
tractarians
130
skepticism130
exhibited by bickel and the judicial tradition beginning
skepticism
with holmes some of these theorists see a fairly broad scope for a
constructive judicial role in an imperfectly democratic society but
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nevertheless contend for the need to distinguish moral and legal issues
and for the importance of questions of relative institutional competence
131
role
in general terms
in assessing the nature and extent of the judicial
however these theorists share the whig assumption that individual
rights arise from a society and its values and that the implied rights
tradition does not of itself charge judges with the task of searching for the
holy grail of moral and natural rights
it may not be possible or even fruitful to resolve the question as to
comports
ports with our constiwhich vision of our constitutional order best com
comforts
tutional
tut ional origins and tradition for one thing the general tension has been
with us from the beginning moreover it can equally be contended that
at least some modem exponents of bickels whig model reflect
twentieth century skepticism and pluralism that fail to do justice to the
condrac
higher law background of the constitution or that modem contrac
carians
tarians pursue a substantive agenda foreign to the founders thinking
while advocating a judicial role that would have been unthinkable in
eighteenth century america there are elements of truth in both of these
critiques but each misses the point that if the framers did not enumerate
all the rights that might be recognized they also did not define an
pannicular
particular judicial role in giving
underlying theory of rights or prescribe a particularjudicial
them effect
for the thoughtful latter day saint this continuing debate is bound
to prompt careful reflection on the one hand we have been assured that
the freedoms guaranteed by the constitution are divinely inspired to
promote human agency 32 president ezra taft benson recently stated
his conviction that one of the constitutions eternal principles is the
idea that our rights are god given as part of the divine plan rather than
granted by government as part of the political plan 133 latter day
Con tractarian model of
saints therefore have reasons for preferring a contractarian
preexisting rights that earthly government is bound to respect arguably
the corollary is that we are obligated to fill out to the best of our ability
a complete theory of our god given liberty rather than relying to any
degree on the relativistic assumptions of the whig model As edwin B
of BYU studies illustrates the relativistic
Fin
Fir mages
nages article in this issue ofbyu
firmager
firmages
finnages
thinking suggested by the whig model can lend itself to decision making
socle
societys
undergirded
undergirder by little more than socie
tyss conventional morality which
society
in one well known historical instance at least led to oppression of
mormon religious thought and practice
monnon
for latter day saints the natural rights tradition might also
modern supreme court
seem to warrant to use prominent examples modem
decisions recognizing the right of parents to send their children to private
schools and suggesting that legal restrictions on parental decision
making as to the size of their families could be constitutionally justified
134
interest
a
government
compelling
it might therefore be
only by
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non liberal constitutional theory will be sufficiently
doubted whether any nonliberal
robust to ensure the degree of personal liberty that our religious
commitment to freedom requires this is essentially the position taken
by R collin mangrum in his article in this issue of BYU studies
on the other hand the founding eras republican themes under
scoring the connection between virtue and democratic government are
also likely to strike responsive chords within latter day saints 135 for
example many thoughtful people continue to see the potential of law as
a teacher of moral standards that if lived by arguably enhance personal
autonomy and capacity 136 within liberal theory the debate over the
legitimacy of laws prohibiting suicide and access to obscene materials
drugs and prostitution to use representative examples would turn on the
question of whether the conduct threatens direct and immediate hann
hanm
harm to
non liberal theory would justify the prohibition of
others by contrast nonliberal
such conduct because of its impact on the individuals participating as
well as on the moral climate of society
it is doubtful whether the mormon concept of the inspired
constitution and the inspired nature of its relationship to human
freedom is a sufficient basis for preferring liberal to nonliberal
non liberal conceptions of the proper scope of political liberty that the freedom of religion
and conscience were inspired elements of the constitution does not tell
us whether to embrace social contract moral theory or any other
particular conception of those rights that god is the source of the
protection of liberty does not necessarily imply that political freedom is
the ultimate priority or that there is not a broader balance to be struck
between liberty and competing values than the one embodied in liberal
theory freedom of religion and conscience defined in some fairly
robust way are required so that individuals might meaningfully choose
among competing claims of ultimate truth and then act upon those
choices obviously for example the creation of an official state church
particularly if backed by legal restrictions on religious liberty could
significantly impede the ability of individuals to exercise their agency as
to lifes central questions but while it can be plausibly argued that an
underlying principle of respect for individual moral autonomy requires
protection of a much broader range of lifestyle
life style choices than the courts
have protected historically we have no more definitive grounds for
determining the scope of the inspired principle than we do for concluding
that the framers intended the concept of constitutional rights to be so
extended 37
it seems clear in any event that morals laws do not pose the kind
of irreconcilable conflict with a meaningful ideal of human freedom
presented by the actions of totalitarian regimes around the world 138
indeed such laws frequently involve close tradeoffs
trade offs between
competing values that relate to freedom for example although drug
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laws restrict freedom of choice the problems of tolerance and physical
and psychological dependence on drugs raise a serious question whether
we act to prevent individuals from in effect alienating their freedom a
choice we do not authorize in the case of slavery because we consider
log
personal freedom to be an inalienable right 139
moreover in a society in which the pressures to use drugs are
frequently intense legal prohibitions may be needed simply to keep in
equilibrium the forces impacting on individual choice while the notion
of authentic choice as a principle for limiting freedom may carry seeds
of abuse 1I remain skeptical of a tolerance for competing conceptions
of the good life that would require government to stand by while
thousands of young people some of them legally adults stumble into
heroin and cocaine habits that will cost them dearly body and soul
many would therefore question whether contractarian
Contractarian models
based on the inspired constitution or not ought to govern our resolution
of particular questions about the reach of liberty it might be contended
for example that the proper decisions with respect to regulating morals
ought to come from democratic debate and a delicate legislative
balancing of the benefits and harms that flow from such laws as well as
from their repeal some would contend that in a world in which laws have
served a standard setting function the repeal of morals legislation might
be taken as a moral sanction of the previously prohibited conduct to the
extent that we may doubt whether the constitution should be read as
long standing
preempting this political debate particularly in view of the longstanding
nature of many such laws it is perhaps the whig view that is speaking
Contractarian approach might also hold the view
skeptics of the contractarian
existence
nce of moral rights does not in itself resolve
that commitment to the existe
the institutional question as to who ought to put them into effect the
constitution expressly provides for freedom of religion and speech and
implicitly recognizes the power of courts to scrutinize laws for their
constitutionality but as we have seen it is far less clear that the
constitution embodies liberal theory or contemplates judicial enforcement of far ranging rights the supreme courts laissez faire era
demonstrated that the preservation of rights of some can come at the cost
of the legitimate rights and interests of others many contend that the
supreme courts decision legalizing abortion similarly rejects the claims
1400
in
As a
life
rights
favor
other
claimed
of
offered on behalf of unborn
society in any event we have concluded that the judicial impositions of
the laissez faire era did more harm than good
the notion of an open ended charge to the judiciary to articulate a
total theory of rights is to say the least in tension with the concept of
checks and balances a doctrine that had its roots in skepticism about
untrammeled power anywhere 141 while there are important formal and
informal checks on the supreme court including the appointment
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power amendment of the constitution and the possibility of impeachment none may be sufficient to prevent abuse of power by a court that
considers itself the moral prophet to the nation the most important
check is the courts willingness to question its own exercise of power 142
As a people who have been warned of the tendency of almost all men to
exercise power inappropriately dac
d&c 12137 we are likely to
appreciate justice jacksons reminder to his colleagues on the court that
we are not final because we are infallible we are infallible only because
we are final 143
this debate over our individual rights tradition and the role of
courts in a democratic society is bound to divide even those of us who see
the divine spark within the constitution it may even prompt a degree of
internal tension that portion of ourselves that feels commitment to the
abstract ideals of liberty and justice and the concept of natural or basic
Con tractarian model for constimoral rights may be drawn to a broad contractarian
tutional decision making that portion that doubts our own wisdom
recalls the debatable historical underpinnings of the unenumerated rights
tradition and perceives the risks of abuse of power by any branch of
ease about the broadest views of the judicial
atease
government may feel less at
adease
role being marketed today where we fall on the spectrum of views about
the supreme court and the constitution will be determined by the
relative strength of these competing impulses within us
the unenumerated rights debate need not however radically alter
our conclusions about constitutional interpretation in general if the
unenumerated rights tradition is justified it is precisely because the text
in context points us beyond the text or at least does not preclude such a
reading alternatively we may have concluded that the text contem
bontem
plates that judicial decisions might under certain circumstances become
the authoritative construction of the constitutional text if this tradition
potentially gives a degree of freedom and power to the courts in the area
this does not imply that there are no limits on the
of individual rights thisdoes
court or that every area of constitutional decision making is equally
indeterminate in at least one important area of course acceptance of this
tradition will make constitutional interpretation in any narrow sense
less central to the debate over the proper direction of constitutional
decision making it does not however work any general repeal of the
duty of decision makers to abide by the terms of our written compact
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raoul berger is the legal historian who comes closest to concluding that original intent is capable of
answering every important question see thomas B mcaffee berger vs the supreme court the implications
ofdayton law review 9 winter 1984 219236 37 and n 113
of his exceptions clause odyssey university of dayton
for the view that the framers intention is relevant to our discourse but never binding see richard B saphire
judicial review in the name of the constitution university of ofdayton
dayton law review 8 summer 1983 745750
and terrance sandalow constitutional interpretation michigan law review 79 april 1981 1033 1069 72
12john hart ely democracy and distrust A theory ofjudicial
john
Cambridge harvard university
reviewc&mbndge
reviewcambridge
of judicial Review
press 1980 11
4 1 thomas C grey do we have an unwritten Constitution
Stanford law review 27 1975
constitutionstanford
111
703 717 see also robert W bennett the mission of moral reasoning in constitutional law southern
california law review 58 1985 647 and robert W bennett objectivity in constitutional law university
pennsylvania law review 132 march 1984 445 96
of ofpennsylvania
robert bennett and john ely in particular offer various objections to original intent but focus their
concern on broadly worded vague constitutional provisions
14
for skeptical treatment of one or both of these assumptions see ronald M dworkin A matter of
principle cambridge harvard university press 1985 34 38 and paul brest the Mis conceived quest for the
formulation of
original understanding boston university law review 60 1980 204 for a representative fonnulation
these assumptions see henry P monaghan our perfect constitution new york university law review 56
may june 1981 353 374 75 383
this essay will not address the difficult questions presented by the doctrine that courts are bound by prior
judicial decisions in determining what is authoritative in
in constitutional law at least some who see original intent
for
decisis the doctrine of offollowing
following
forstate
as generally binding on constitutional interpreters nonetheless find room forstare
stare delisis
precedent to shield even some incorrect decisions see henry P monaghan taking supreme court decisions
senory maryland law review
senary
1979 117
39 no I1 19791
7 10
seriously
review39no
even scholars who criticized resort to original intent as a fileo pietistic notion that has no place in
in the
jurisprudence of the twentieth century and contended that the framers should not rule us from their graves have
nevertheless acknowledged that clear text is binding arthur S miller and ronald F howell the myth of
neutrality in constitutional law university of chicago law review 27 1960 661 683
16see
see for example bennett objectivity 474 saphire judicial review 774 75 and brest
Mis conceived quest
17
222
brest Mis conceived quest 214 15
15222

lii
iii
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monaghan our perfect constitution 353 374 76
see for example frederick schauer an essay on constitutional language UCLA law review 29
april 1982 797 832 compare bennett objectivity 457 60
21for
rati fiers intent see monaghan our
for an argument that framers intent should generally count as the ratifiers
perfect constitution 375 n 130
compare for example max radin statutory interpretation harvard law review 43 april 1930
21

863 85 with reed dickerson the interpretation and application ofstatutes
of statutes boston little brown and
1975 71 79 critiquing radins skepticism as to the coherence of the notion of legislative intent
22 see
for example brest Mis conceived quest 211

construing the constitution 8 10
see sandalow constitutional interpretation 1038 39
gerald
geraid C maccallum legislative intent yale law journal 75 april 1966
dickerson interpretation and application 77

co

obrennan
2brennan
brennan

26at
at the end of an important skeptical piece for example paul

754 55 see also

brest acknowledges that text and original

understanding create a defeasible presumption that would exert the strongest claims when they are contemporary
and thus likely to reflect current values and beliefs brest misconceived
Mis conceived quest 229 to exert even a strong
misconceiver
claim original understanding must be knowable
21
U S 16 wall 36 77 1873
slaughterhouse 83 US
21
ibid at 77
21ibid
ibid at 78
ibid at 77 80
311bid
ibid at 79 millers conclusion was no coincidence he had been the author of crandall vs nevada
U S 6 wall 35 1867 in which the court struck down a nevada head tax because it interfered with the right
73 US
found was derivable from the relationship between united states
to travel to the nations capital that the court
courtfound
citizens and their national government he was thus the logical person to perceive the possibility that the
amendments protection of the privileges or immunities of national citizenship was designed primarily to provide
an explicit textual foundation and a certain federal remedy to rights already implicit in the structure and

relationships created by the constitution
32see
see for example raoul berger government by judiciary the transformation of the fourteenth
amendment cambridge harvard university press 1977 25 26 quoting the senate sponsor of the civil rights
act senator trumbull and citing references in the black codes throughout the congressional debates
311bid
ibid see generally richard bardolph the civil rights record black americans and the law
1849 1870 new york crowell 1970 36 37
34jt
it was explicitly invoked by senators lyman trumbull and william howard and congressman james
wilson the civil rights bills house sponsor see congressional globe 39th cong 1I st sess 600 1866 senator

trumbull ibid 1118 congressman wilson ibid 2765 senator howard
see charles fairman
rights7 Stan
fanman
fan man does the fourteenth amendment incorporate the bill of Rights
fah
Stanford
foid law
stanfordlaw
review 2 1949 5 10 17 corfield is reported at 6 F cas 546 C C E D pa 1823 no 3230
31
corfield 6 F cas at 551 52
see for example congressional globe 39th cong ist sess 474 75 600 1866 statements of
31see
senator trumbull
see for example fairman bill of rights 9 12
31see
31
michael kent curtis the bill of rights as a limitation on state authority A reply to professor
59 67 68 when congressman bingham introduced
berger wake forest law review 16 february 1980 45
455967
the fourteenth amendment he pointed out that
of
a resolution proposing an amendment that evolved into section I1 odthe
ofthe
he had intentionally drawn the language from the fourth article of the constitution congressional globe
4 1866
39th cong ist sess 1033 34
40eiy
ely democracy and distrust 22 24 superfluous justice field in dissent said the majority opinion
vain and idle enactment 173 U
made it a valn
USS at 96
ely democracy and distrust 11
22
wor
tor the broadest and narrowest readings respectively see ely democracy
demoo
damoo acy and distrust 22 30 and
berger government by judiciary 20 5 1
any
perry
prominent examples are michael J perrythe
Per
and human rights an inquiry
ryThe
the constitution the courts andhuman
into the legitimacy of constitutional policymaking by the judiciary new haven yale university press 1982
and simon authority of the constitution
for the best summary of the alternative possible readings of the war clause and the evidence for the
reading described in text see william van alstyne congress the president and the power to declare war A
requiem for vietnam university of pennsylvania law review 121 november 1972 1 5 11 see generally
francis D wormuth and edwin B firmager
firmage7
firmaget7o chain the dog of war the war power of congress in history
and law dallas southern methodist university press 1985
41
madisons
typical of the statements of the framers is james Madi
matisons
sons assertion that the power to declare
war including the power of judging of the causes of war is fully and exclusively vested in the legislature
james madison letters and other writings new york R worthington 1884 2642 43 pronouncements by
all three branches throughout the nations history support the traditional understanding it was not until the
korean war that a president claimed that his powers as commander in chief fully authorized him to initiate war
vil
vn 17 160 interestingly
without the consent of congress firmage and wormuth to chain the dog of war vii
41

1
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ism as a general methodology has acknowledged
originalism
onginahsm
originalist
david richards a scholar known as a forceful critic of original
ight of text context and history makes a compelling case that congress has in recent decades abdicated
weight
that the we
its constitutional power and duty over war david A J richards interpretation and historiography southern
california law review 58 1985 490 519
see for example laurence H tribe american constitutional law mineola NY
N Y foundation press
46see
1978 174 contending that the framers narrow view of the power to repel sudden attacks was in proportion to
the military needs oftheir
of their day attack on a strategically important ally might require similar dispatch today the
issue raised is probably not a critical one in that congress would undoubtedly concur in presidential action in
the contexts in which the principle would clearly be applicable as in western europe
41 41wormuth
wormuth and firmage to chain the dog of war 29
some would make the presidents emergency power the wedge that would reverse the original
41some
implications of the war clause in 1966 for example leonard meeker the legal adviser to the state department
contended that the executives emergency power could justify the war in vietnam because in modem times we
recognize that an armed attack against vietnam would endanger the peace and safety of the united states
vietnam department lofstate
of the united states participation in the defense of ofvietnam
ofthe
leonard meeker the legality odthe
of state
ofstate
bulletin 54 1966 484 but surely that is precisely the sort of question that the framers left to congress for
additional perspectives on these issues compare J william fulbright american foreign policy in the 20th
13 expressing senator
century under an l8th
isth
lath century constitution cornell law quarterly 47 fall 1961
1

Ful
fulbrights
brights early view that presidents must have full responsibility for military decisions in a shrinking world and
fulbnghts
fui
questioning whether we can afford the luxury of eighteenth century procedures with wormuth and firmage
to chain the dog of war 267 77 arguing that need for deliberation and consensus is even greater in the nuclear
age with so much at stake
U S 4 wheat 316407 1819
49mccuiloch
mcculloch vs maryland 17 US
see frederick schauer easy cases southern california law review 58 1985 399 for a more
skeptical view see tushnet textualism
51
consider for example laurence H tribe on our constitution meese Is true radical USA today
17 october 1985
madison didnt even have a telephone why try to imagine how he would feel about
wire
wiretapping7
tapping
wiretapping
see perry the constitution the courts and human rights 32 33
52see
of law rev ed new haven yale university press 1969 84
lon L fuller the morality orlaw
oflaw

the example is from dickerson

interpretation and application 129

14the

ad ed new york dover
80 see also 23 24 A J ayer language truth and logic 2d
publications 1952 86 and josef kohler judicial interpretation of enacted law in science oflegal
legal method
of legai
repnnt new york A M kelley 1969 187 188
Brunc ken and layton B register 1921 repent
trans ernest bruncken
bruecken
reprint
for a brief treatment see thomas B mcaffee berger vs the supreme court 268 711
551bid
ibid

dickerson interpretation and application 240
schauer constitutional language 801 806 7
As to what does follow representative responses are perry

the constitution

the courts and human

66 1 bennett moral reasoning and
lawreviewss 1985 661
rights brest who decides southern california lawreview58
harvard journal orlaw
of law and public
frank H easterbrook legal interpretation and the power of the judiciary harvardjournal
oflaw

policy 7 no

1984
11984

1

87 99

246 47
243246
dickerson interpretation and application 243
24324647

see for example sandalow constitutional interpretation
61see
62a
A good example is Madi
constitutionality of legislative prayer see marsh vs
flop on the consitutionality
flipflop
sons flip
madisons
matisons
U S 783 807 815 1983 brennan J dissenting it is difficult to believe his original position
chambers 463 US
represented a view of the meaning of the establishment clause so much as a position on the appropriate scope
and application of a principle whose contours awaited defining
see for example neil K komesar back to the future an institutional view of making and
sce
191
idi1 and brest who decides
interpreting constitutions northwestern university law review 81 1987 19
14 14komesar
komesar back to the future 210 16
terrance sandalow the distrust of politics new york university law review 56 1981 446460
see thomas C grey origins of the unwritten constitution fundamental law in american
66see
revolutionary thought stanford law review 30 1978 843 93 grey unwritten constitution 7 and edward
S corwin
the higher law background of american constitutional law harvard law review 42

december 1928 january 1929 149 85365 409
673
3 US Q3dall3863881798
dall
dali
dail 386 388 1798
68
edwards
EdwardS corwin liberty against government baton rouge louisiana state university press 1948
66

6qjis
this tension was first brought to my attention by grey unwritten constitution 9 708 9
71
vs madison 5 U S 1 I cranch at 179
marburyvs
Marbury
71
see US
U S constitution article 3 section 2 clause 1I emphasis added
71see
12 12calder
U S Q3 dall at 399 iredell J iredell had been a delegate to the north carolina
calder vs bull 3 US
judicial review from that period forw
ard see berger
ofthe
of the power of ofjudicial
foiw
forward
ratifying convention and an ardent defender odthe
congress vs the supreme court 20
73
corwin liberty against government 89
U S constitution
see for example the fifth amendment of the US
74see
1
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see for example rex E lee A lawyer looks at the constitution provo brigham young university
press 1980 163 and corwin liberty against government 91
16thus
USS 516 1884 the supreme court reasoned law is something
thus in hurtado vs california 110 U
more than mere will exerted as an act of
power and therefore enacted law must not be a special rule for a particular
ofpower
1

so that every citizen shall hold his life liberty property
person or a particular case but
the general law
and immunities under the protection ofthe
odthe
of the general rules that govern society and thus excluding as not due process
and other similar special partial and
of law acts of attainder bills of pains and penalties acts of confiscation
arbitrary exertions of power under the forms of legislation 535 36
for a brief account of this development see tribe american constitutional law 427 36
it has been estimated that 197 state or federal regulations were stricken by the supreme court between
1899 and 1937 tribe american constitutional law 435 n 2
ibid 450 55
8ofor
for a general treatment of the right of privacy see ibid 886 990
As
to the text see ely democracy and distrust 18 19 and schauer easy cases 431 n 83 As to the
astothetexseeelydemocracy
pre constitutional history of due process see ralph U whitten the constitutional limitations on state choice
proconstitutional
preconstitutional
861 67 As to the more ambiguous
of law due process hastings constitutional law quarterly 9 1982 851
851861
historical context of the fourteenth amendment due process clause see whitten due process 867 94

corwin liberty against government 114 15
83
justice black opposed application of substantive due process in every context see griswold vs
U S 479511 13 1965 black J dissenting justice harlan by contrast relied on the doctrine
connecticut 381 US
but appealed for judicial restraint in its application ibid at 501 2 harlan J concurring
84 see
for example grey unwritten constitution 9 716 and corwin liberty against government
152 53 grey however acknowledges that there is room for doubt as to whether the ninth amendment was
intended to embody the principle of the unwritten constitution
see for example david A J richards toleration and the constitution new york oxford university
85see
press 1986 256 tribe american constitutional law 570 71 bennett B patterson the forgotten ninth
amendment A call for legislative and judicial recognition of rights under social condition of today
men ill 1955 and norman redlich are there certain rights
merrill
indianapolis bobbs menill
retained by the
peoplet7 new york university law review 37 1962 787 812 john ely goes even further asserting in fact
People
the conclusion that the ninth amendment was intended to signal the existence of federal constitutional rights
beyond the rights specifically enumerated in the constitution is the only conclusion its language seems comfortably
able to support ely democracy and distrust 38
16
U S 486 goldberg J concurring
Griswold vs connecticut 381 US
82

As long ago as 1980 more than a thousand cases were found in which state courts and lower federal courts
cornet law review 66 1980 1 n 2
cited the ninth amendment raoul berger the ninth amendment cornell
cornel

see generally ibid redlich are there
rightist9
rights9
certain rightst
Rights
therecertain
43
and the ninth amendment virginia law review 42 1956 627
62743
see for example berger the ninth amendment 3 6
89see

and

leslie W dunbar james madison

washington wrote to lafayette that the convention decided not to include a bill of rights because
ofgeorge
the people evidently retained every thing which they did not in express terms give up the writings of george
johncC fitzpatrick 9 vols washington DC
D C united states panting
washington
washingtonfrom
pnnting
printing
from the original sources ed john
office 1931 1944 29478 also quoted in berger the ninth amendment 6 hamilton wrote that in
stnctness the people surrender nothing and as they retain every thing they have no need of particular reservations
strictness
no 84 of the federalist 578
91
91madison
madison was speaking before the first congress as he presented resolutions that became the bill of
rights quoted in patterson the forgotten ninth amendment 114
92
quoted in dunbar james madison 629 30 hamilton agrees in the federalist no 84
579
84579
gothe
1904 5 2711 also
the writings ofjames
of james madison ed gaillard hunt 9 vols new york G P putnam 1904527
quoted in berger the ninth amendment 8
381 US
U S at 507 black J dissenting ibid at 527 stewart J dissenting
1381
91these proposed amendments are reprinted in dunbar james madison
631 32
these
96
I1 I1 emphasis added
quoted in patterson the forgotten ninth amendment I1111
lii
ili
971bid
ibid

115

richards tribe
anbe patterson redlich and ely all take this view see n 85
tnbe
at least one commentator john ely has contended that the clause was designed to preclude a
3 6 compare
enlarged powers as well as denying additional rights ely democracy anddistrusf
and distrust 36
construction of ofenlarged
al commentaries on the theconstitution
joseph H story et
etal
constitution ofthe
united states ed E S arthur 3 vols 1833
1833repnnt
reprint
odthe unitedstatesed

new york da capo press 1970 3752
3 752 ambiguous statement arguably supporting a dual purpose reading
randolphe
10orandolphs
summan zed in these words in a letter to madison from burnley a member
randolphs
Randolp
hs argument was summarized
trates
states 1786 18705 vols
rhe constitution odthe
odthe
of the virginia legislature see documentary history odthe
united trares
ofthe
of the
of the unitedstates
ofthe
ofthe
1905 reprint new york johnson 1965 55219
219
101
loi

ibid 221
1021t
it may be significant then that madisons
Madi sons single allusion to the judicial role in enforcing rights
matisons
upon rights expressly stipulated for in
observed that the courts will be naturally led to resist every encroachment uponnghts
the constitution by the declaration of rights quoted in patterson the forgotten ninth amendment 116 see also

berger the ninth amendment
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some commentators for example have pointed to expressions of
concern by madison that basic rights
ofconcem
james madison 527
orconstrued with sufficient latitude writings ofjames
5 271 72 compare redlich
not be drafted or construed
might
ighut
of fames
ighlt
are therecertain
Madi sons assertion in no 37 oithe
odthe federalist that words
matisons
there certain rights 805 and n 86 relying on madisons
ofthe
are incapable of expressing complex ideas with complete accuracy the suggestion is that the ninth amendment
serves the purpose of avoiding limiting constructions the only problem is that no such statements were made in
the context of debate over the ninth amendment itself
general declaring the existence of inherent and inalienable rights as
at the state level the device of generally
part of a declaration of rights was already established prior to ratification of the federal constitution see patterson
the forgotten ninth amendment 22
see ely democracy and distrust 203 n 87
101see
see for example lawrence tribe celebration ofthe
odthe
of the mind harvard
barard law bulletin 38 winter 1986
harard
1

6

see
101see

for example ely democracy and distrust 37 and redlich certain rights 805
U S 68
the incorporation theory is associated with justice black adamson vs california 332 US
1947 black J dissenting but a number of other justices have held to this view I1 say presumably this
incorporation view would include the ninth amendment because one of the speeches from the legislative history
of the fourteenth amendment relied on for this view states only that the personal rights guaranteed and secured
st sess 2765 1866
by the first eight amendments would be included congressional globe 39th cong 1Iist
statement of senator howard an alternative route to the same end is the argument that the privileges or
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment is properly read as delegating authority to elaborate a broad set
of rights not described within the text see for example ely democracy and distrust 22 30 this claim is also
controversial however but the arguments are too involved to go into here the best summary may be timothy S
bishop the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment the original intent northwestern
university law review 79 march 1984 142 90
see for example richards toleration and the constitution R dworkin taking rights seriously
109see
1977 and grey unwritten constitutions
constitution7
constitution7 richards and dworkin are the names most closely associated with
contractanan
Contract
tractarian
the view ofa
contractarian
anan underpinnings ofthe
odthe
of the constitution others
of a moral and political theory as immanent in the Con
odthe
of the constitutions antimajontanan
necess anly rest in moral
believe that the premises ofthe
antimajoritarian individual rights provisions necessarily
theory but are not necessarily
necess anly committed to any sort of historical
histoncal explication or to the nonutilitarian versions of
liberalism defended by richards and dworkin see for example michael S moore A natural law theory of
interpretation southern california law review
relew 58 1985 277 and michael D bayles morality and the
1978 561 71
constitution arizona state law journal 1978
losee perry the constitution the courts and human rights
see
1

I1

robert M cover has observed that notwithstanding the social contract and natural rights thinking of
the founding period the most important figures of the period were seldom if ever guilty of confusing law with
natural right robert M cover justice accused antislavery and the judicial process new haven yale
1975 27 the sources of thinking about rights during the revolutionary and founding period
university press 19751
included the british constitution colonial charters and immemorial usage as well as natural law thinking
or do seclorum
Seclorum the intellectual origins of the constitution lawrence university
forrest mcdonald novus ordo
press of kansas 1985 12 13 36 39 152 53 many who embraced natural law moral and political theory
would not have inferred that natural law was a source of authority for enforceable rights in a duly constituted legal
I1 I1

system

grey on
6 mcdonald novus ordo Sec
66 152 235 R kent greenawalt
seclorum
lorum 7766152235
origins
gins 860 61
the enduring significance of neutral principles columbia law review 78 1978 982 1019 and bayles
see
112see

morality

1

566

grey origins 892
see for example richard vetterli and gary bryner public virtue and the roots of american
114see
government in this issue of brigham young university studies 29 49
a granan and puritanical strands of republicanism of the latter form he
mcdonald distinguishes aggrariin
writes almost nothing was outside the purview of a puritanical republican government for every matter that
might in any way contribute to strengthening or weakening the virtue of the public was a thing of concern to the
public a res publica and was subject to regulation by the public while agrarian republicanism saw
institutional arrangements rather than direct regulation as the key to ensunng
ensuring
ensuing development of virtue its populist
and egalitarian
egah tanan tendencies did not preclude it from having a religious bent or from sanctioning state regulation of
Sec lorum 16 and n 9 71 73 77 89 90 160
morals mcdonald novus ordo seclorum
116
ilg
116during
histo nans have rediscovered and given renewed emphasis to
During the last twenty years revisionist historians
the elements of classical republicanism in the founding period see for example J G A pocock the
atlantic republican tradition princeton princeton
machiavellian
machiav
machias ellian moment florentine political thought and the
theatlantic
rke amencan
rhe
the
american republic 1776 1787 chapel hill
university press 1975 and gordon S wood the creation odthe
of
ofthe
mang
histo mans
nans have contended that this new emphasis on
university of north carolina press 1969 while some historians
ofnew
of new forms of republicanism based on premises
classical republicanism gives insufficient attention to the growth ofner
of liberal individualism see for example joyce appleby republicanism in old and new contexts william and
ofliberal
mary quarterly 43 1986 20 my own review odthe
of the literature uncovered nothing to refute lance bannings claim
ofthe
that the new history at least establishes that nineteenth century america did not begin with and may never have
achieved a liberal consensus lance banning jeffersonian ideology revisited liberal and classical ideas in the
19861 3 13
new american republic william and mary quarterly 43 1986
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republicanism and liberalism in american constitutional thought william

and mary law review 28 1987 57 almost all the modem commentators place human autonomy

the liberty
to make fundamental decisions about ones life plan or style as central in our constitutional scheme contrast the
pennsylvania constitutions prescriptions that laws for the encouragement of virtue and prevention of vice and
or do seclorum
Sec lorum 90 mcdonald cites
immorality shall be made and constantly kept in force mcdonald novus ordo
five state constitutions that contained provisions giving explicit foundation for sumptuary or morals regulating
laws for the general view that modem autonomy based constitutional theories cannot be squared with the
constitution as conceived by the framers see monaghan our perfect constitution

nous ordo seclorum
Sec lorum 85 and raoul berger death penalties the
for example mcdonald novus
supreme courts
court s obstacle course cambridge harvard university press 1982 164 the framers skepticism
of course went to the granting of power to all branches and levels of government
see for example bradford such a government as the people will approve the great convention
S louis
as comic action st
lorum 7 8
seclorum
reviews6 1987 215 mcdonald novus ordo Sec
lows
louls university public law review6
loms
review
pluribus
144 234 35 and forrest mcdonald E
epluribusunum
1965 72121
EPluribus unum boston houghton mifflin 196572
12 1
59 6068
60 68 70
70144234
see
118see

157 58

see
120see

ofprinciple 38 57 as to abstract or general intention richards toleration
dworkin A matter of principle
contractanan
Contract
tractarian
anan moral theory as the best way
contractarian
and the constitution 35 38 as to abstract intention and 52 63 as to Con
to interpret the abstract intentions of the framers
sandalow constitutional interpretation 1046 A number of scholars have been critical of any
ofindividual rights as they evolved over
historical claim that the framers intended for us to elaborate moral theories of individual
time see for example perry the constitution the courts and human rights 70 72 and henry P monaghan
professor jones and the constitution vermont law review
re lew 4 spring 1979 87 91
132 122judge
123
122
judge bork is clearly correct in his assertion that the argument that courts should go directly to moral
theory to develop a complete system of human rights with or without reliance on specific constitutional texts is
a view not expressed by courts or theorists until the last thirty years robert H bork styles in constitutional
theory south texas law review 26 fall 1985 383 84
see for example corwin liberty against government 81 82 87 89
123see
124 see
Sec lorum
U S 623661 1887 and McDonald
Novus
for example mugler vs kansas 123 US
mcdonaldnovus
vovK ordo seclorum
mcdonaldvovk
1

288
12

during the supreme courts laissez faire era for example the court defined the public interest that

a state might pursue through its police power by reference to a liberal theory of government that assumed that the
ofneutrality and fairness departure from which
of property and contract represented a baseline of neutrality
common law rights ofproperty
renew 87 no 5 1987 873
Loch ners legacy columbia law review
would be suspect cass R sunstein lochners
877 79
873877
of contract is the general view and restraint the exception adkins vs childrens hospital
this view that freedom ofcontract
U S 525
261 US
546 1923 has been criticized because in practice it amounted to recognition of a superprotected
525546
right and frequently precluded serious consideration of the argument that the interests of society as a whole are
promoted by labor protective and other types of social legislation gerald gunther constitutional law
N Y foundation press 1985458
1985 458
Mm eola NY
mineola
12when the modem supreme court for example required a compelling state interest to justify any
when
4 10 USS 113154 561973itimplicitly
regulation of the fundamental right to choose abortion roe vs wade
56 1973 it implicitly
wade410u
acknowledged that the states justifications of protecting fetal life and maternal health could be seen as meeting
the traditional rationality standard of promoting the general interest and that only the special force of the right of
privacy excluded it from falling within the scope of the police power As a modem version of the doctrine of
substantive due process roe has thus been criticized as a departure even from the traditional understanding of
that doctrine as a device for ensuring that legislatures enact general rules to promote the public interest rather
than as a source for super protected fundamental rights see john hart ely the wages of crying wolf A
comment on roe
roesvs wade yale law journal 82 1973 920940 43 and thomas B mcaffee constitutional
interpretation gle
of dayton law review 12 1986 275
the
ile uses and limitations of original intent university ofdayton
292 93
see for example lochner vs new york 198 US
U S 45 75 76 holmes J dissenting adamson vs
U S 479
U S 46 67 68 1947 frankfurter J concurring griswold vs connecticut 381 US
california 332 US
501 02 1965 harlan J concurring
even in roe vs wade 4 10
10 US 113 1973 for example the courts opinion can be read either as
12even
recognizing a specially protected fundamental right rooted in liberal political theory or as essentially a judicial
int
act of balancing interests
erets on some utilitarian scales see donald H regan rewriting roe vss wade michigan
interets
164 1 considering the courts own unwillingness to extend the decision to
15691641
law
review 77 august 1979 1569
lawreiew
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